Exhibit 24

Deposition of Robert H. Topel
(December 6, 2017)
(excerpted)


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267
            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                DISTRICT OF NEVADA
    CUNG LE; NATHAN QUARRY, JON
    FITCH, on behalf of
    themselves and all others
    similarly situated,
              Plaintiffs,
                                     Case No.
              vs.
                                     2:15-cv-01045-RFB-(PAL)
    ZUFFA, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate
    Fighting Championship and
    UFC,
              Defendant.
                 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
          CONTINUED VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF
                ROBERT TOPEL, VOL. II
                  Washington, D.C.
                  December 6, 2017
                      8:39 a.m.
REPORTED BY:
Tina Alfaro, RPR, CRR, RMR
Job No. 52570
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	340		342
1	now you've inserted firm. So no.	1	firm's here and there's other firms and I'm going
2	Q. All right. Firms in a market, if I change	2	to hire instead of trying to attract people to
3	the the all right. I'll reask the question	3	my taco stand I'm going to hire people from along
4	this way. A market can have an infinite number	4	the road between my firm and another firm and
5	in order for a market to have a horizontal supply	5	they're all uniformly distributed. I'm making up
6	curve there would need to be an infinite number of	6	this model. And I'll get the same taco stand kind
7	equivalent workers at exactly the same wage; is	7	of thing on the input side. If I want to hire more
8	that right?	8	I have to reach further down the road and it's
9	A. No.	9	costly to drive. So I'll increase the marginal
10	Q. What was wrong with that?	10	price that I pay I'll have to increase the
11	A. Infinite. Does the the supply curve	11	marginal price that I pay.
12	needs to be can be perfectly elastic over a	12	Q. Okay. So let's take your taco stand
13	relevant range where demand in this market is	13	example. You have to taco stand A on one side of
14	shifting and there will be no material effect on	14	the road and then a mile away you have taco stand
15	prices. I mean, there's not an infinite number of	15	B.
16	workers anywhere.	16	A. Yeah.
17	Q. Okay. So a firm would need to have a	17	Q. Now let's say somebody puts a toll on that
18	substantial material number of equivalent	18	road and all of a sudden in order to get from taco
19		19	stand A to taco stand B it costs a hundred dollars
20	workers I mean, a market would need to have a	20	***************************************
21	substantial number of equivalent workers at exactly	21	and before it used to cost zero dollars. All
22	the same wage in order for there to be a horizontal		things equal, would that toll increase the mobility
	supply curve; is that right?	22	costs of workers?
23	A. I said over the relevant range.	23	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
24	Q. Over the relevant	24	BY THE WITNESS:
25	A. So if we if we have there needs to	25	A. So now I'm just just so I'm clear,
	341		343
1	be enough to prevent the wage from rising when	1	now I'm hiring workers for my taco stand?
2	demand shifts.	2	Q. Yes.
3	Q. All right.	3	A. So there's a toll that prevents people
4	A. And enough depends on the circumstances.	4	from the other side of town getting to my taco
5	Q. Is it fair to say that when mobility of	5	stand?
6	workers is becomes restricted or is costly firms	6	Q. Yes, and vice-versa.
7	in that market could obtain some monopsony power?	7	A. Okay. So yeah, there's fewer people that
8	A. Your statement is so broad and vague	8	I can hire from the other side of town.
9	that you know, I'll come back to my taco stands.	9	Q. So now as compared to a world with the
10	And there's some costs of going to the next taco	10	hundred-dollar toll and the world without the
11	stand so that people who live closest to my taco	11	hundred-dollar toll, the two taco stands in the
12	stand prefer my taco stand to the taco stand that's	12	world with the hundred-dollar toll have more
13	further away even though our tacos are in all other	13	monopsony power than the world without the
14	respects identical. That means that if I cut the	14	hundred-dollar toll, correct?
15	price of my tacos more people come to me. If I	15	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
16	raise the price of my tacos fewer people come to	16	BY THE WITNESS:
17	me. That is not a completely horizontal demand	17	A. I think what you're trying to say is
18	curve. So in that sense and that's the sense in	18	that let's say here's A and B taco stands and
19	which George is using it here in a lot of this	19	the middle of town is halfway in between, and then
20	discussion one might say that there's a degree	20	I build a wall, okay, the Berlin Wall there so
21	of monopsony power if we define if we define	21	people can't get across from from so people
22	monopsony power to mean that if I cut my price I	22	between halfway and my taco stand and the
23	sell more and if I raise my price I say monopsony	23	percentage there's nobody else in town can
24	power in that case. And you can do the same thing	24	only work for my taco stand. They can't go work
25	on the other side of the market. So, you know, my	25	for the other taco stand.
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20 (Pages 340 to 343)

344 346 1 Q. Correct. 1 Q. So all things equal, the higher the 2 2 A. Is that what we're saying? mobility costs in the example the more monopsony 3 3 power the firms in that example have, all things O. Yes. 4 A. Yeah. So these people have fewer options. 4 equal; is that right? 5 5 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. I got it. 6 6 BY THE WITNESS: Q. And when you compare the world with the 7 Berlin Wall in your example in the world without 7 A. It was important that you said twice "in 8 that example." So I agree. the Berlin Wall, the firm with the Berlin Wall has 8 9 more monopsony power, correct? 9 Q. And in that example we're talking about 10 10 A. The firm with the -- the firm -- I -- I taco stands, right? These aren't Taco Bell, right? 11 11 won't be competing as aggressively to get people It could be a small firm that has some degree of 12 from across the place where the border is now. So, 12 monopsony power; is that right? 13 13 you know, I don't know how things played out in the A. Yes. Well, as the term -- as we're using 14 output market. I mean, I understand what you're 14 the term. It's just a dangerous term on both sides 15 15 trying to say and you're saying the same thing of the market. 16 16 here, and you're saying the same thing that I said. Q. Is it fair to say that one reason why 17 There's a degree of monopsony power. You didn't 17 non-Zuffa firms employ some of the challenged 18 18 need the wall. I already said there's a degree of contractual provisions that we've talked about is 19 what some people would call monopsony power there 19 to restrain the mobility of the fighters that work 20 20 by the fact that it is -- it is costly to move from for them? 21 A to B. 21 A. It's to do all the things we've discussed 22 22 O. And -before that -- you know, to see to it that they get 23 23 A. So if it became more costly to move from A the returns on their investments and that their 24 to B, that degree of -- of control over price would 24 ability to manage a multi-bout career progression 25 increase a little bit. 25 is not interfered with. 345 347 1 1 Q. And one way in which they achieve those Q. So all things equal, the higher the 2 2 mobility costs in your example the higher the ends is by restricting the mobility of the workers, 3 monopsony power of the firms, correct? 3 correct? 4 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 4 A. In the sense that I just used, yes. 5 5 BY THE WITNESS: Q. And so in that sense even these smaller 6 6 A. Yeah. It depends on how we make the promotions can use these contracts to gain some 7 7 mobility costs and things like that. It depends on measure of monopsony power; is that right? 8 what we do with the mobility costs. 8 9 Q. We raise the costs. So go back to my toll 10 example. Assume that the Berlin Wall costs \$100 to 11 get from one side to the other and now assume it 12 costs a thousand dollars to get from one side to 13 the other. As compared to the world where it costs 14 a hundred dollars to the world where it costs a 15 thousand dollars, the firms in the world where it 16 costs a thousand dollars would have a higher degree 17 of monopsony power than the -- all things equal, 18 than the firms in the world where it costs a 19 hundred dollars. 20 A. I think what you're trying to establish is 21 that the people on my side of the wall have fewer 22 places -- because there's only two places, have 23 fewer places at which they can work and that 24 affects the wage that I have to pay to get them to 25 work for me, and I agree with that.

21 (Pages 344 to 347)




22 (Pages 348 to 351)

352 354 1 the run -- one at 4:43 p m. from Chiappetta who is 1 these clauses is to protect the investments that 2 2 talking about a conversation he had with Bjorn have already occurred. 3 3 Rebney. Bjorn Rebney was the head of Bellator at Now, on the first page here it says that 4 the time and this is dated September 25th, 2012. 4 5 And I'd like to turn your attention to the next 6 page where Chiappetta, who is a reporter, is 7 reporting a conversation that Chiappetta had with 8 Rebney to the UFC. 9 A. Can I -- can I just read the rest of is -- it's an equilibrium where this contract 10 10 restriction has not been used. It could be still this. 11 11 binding, but it hasn't been used. Q. Please do. 12 12 (Witness reviewing document.) 13 BY THE WITNESS: 14 A. Remind me who Mike is because you've only 15 got a Gmail address. 16 16 Q. Mike Chiappetta is an MMA reporter. Q. Is it your opinion that if the UFC has 17 17 never during -- had never during a right to match Anthony Evans is an executive at the UFC. 18 A. So he's conveying some conversation that 18 period matched a rival's bid that that would mean 19 he had with somebody at Bellator; is that what he's 19 the right to match clause had no effect in the 20 20 marketplace? 21 21 Q. Correct. Chiappetta communicated with A. That was the implication that I was trying 22 22 to convey at the end of my answer. That doesn't Bjorn Rebney, who was the President of Bellator at 23 the time, and then he's communicating a 23 mean that it's not binding. It doesn't mean that 24 conversation that Chiappetta had with Rebney to the 24 it doesn't have an effect. It's not -- it's not 25 UFC. And on the second page of the e-mail --25 put into the contracts for nothing. It serves a 353 355 1 A. He says "Eventually"; is that sentence 1 purpose. 2 2 you'd like me to read? Q. So even if the right to match clause has 3 3 never been, quote/unquote, used, it's still having 4 an effect in the marketplace, correct? 5 A. It could be having an effect in the 6 marketplace even if they've never had to invoke. 7 Q. And why is that? 10 Q. Do you know whether Zuffa eliminated the 11 right to match clause in response to Rebney's 12 challenge? 13 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 14 BY THE WITNESS: 15 A. Well, you know, I don't know if there was 16 an actual challenge. This is being relayed by a 17 reporter. We know how sometimes that can get 17 Q. Sounds to me like that answer said the 18 18 muddled. But I don't know if this is in -- this right to match is not doing any work. How is the 19 19 sounds like it's in the context of a particular right to match doing any work, procompetitive work 20 transaction, but, you know, one wouldn't be 20 or anticompetitive work, economic work if Zuffa 21 surprised if some competitor would say, hey, you've would just outbid any potential rival? Why doesn't 21 22 22 invested a lot in all these folks, wouldn't you Zuffa just get rid of the right to match, then, if 23 23 like to get rid of this clause because then, you it knows it can just outbid any rival? 24 know, it would give us greater access to the people 24 Well, we go through this in my report. 25 25 you've invested in. That's the point of having

23 (Pages 352 to 355)

356 358 1 1 if it came down to, oh, why don't they just -- why 3 4 don't they just outbid, well, if Bellator makes its different once the right to match period expires 5 best offer and it knows that Zuffa will match, 5 than during the right to match? 6 then, you know, the returns to making its best 6 A. They could be, though there's a question 7 7 offer aren't as high as otherwise. Now, take of why Bellator make an offer in the right to match 8 that -- take away the right to match and you come 8 period and they're gaining information about this 9 back to the example that I have in my report about 9 fighter from the fact that -- it's your 10 10 the holdup problem where you're more valuable to hypothetical. There's no contract between Zuffa 11 Zuffa, the athlete knows it. So now you've got a 11 and the fighter a year after the end of his 12 12 bilateral negotiation where there's no determinant contract. So you're -- Bellator's looking at that 13 13 solution in economics except that it's going to be at the end and saying, you know, winner's curse 14 somewhere in between and depends on the relative 14 might be operative here. So if we win what is it 15 15 intransigence of the two parties where you're going that Zuffa knew about this fighter that we don't. 16 16 to end up. Q. Well, assume that Zuffa made a bid and the 17 17 Q. So you just said -fighter didn't accept it. 18 18 A. Let me finish. So I said that the -- what A. Okay. 19 I've just described is the holdup problem that's in 19 Q. I'll withdraw it. I'm going to move on. 20 20 my report that the right of first refusal is Would you agree with me that the conduct 21 designed to avoid. 21 engaged in by a firm without market power could 22 22 Q. One of the things you said is that if be -- could have anticompetitive effects when that 23 Bellator makes its best bid during a UFC right to 23 same conduct is engaged in by a firm with market 24 match period the returns to Bellator to making that |24 power? 25 bid aren't as high as they would be without the 25 A. That's conceivable. 357 359 1 Q. How is that conceivable? 1 right-to-match period in place; is that right? 2 2 A. No. I just said given that the right to A. Well, take the -- I mean, often in 3 3 contract disputes under section 2, like exclusive match is there, Bellator has to make a calculation 4 that says here's what this athlete is worth to us 4 dealing or loyalty discounts or something like 5 5 that, under certain prerestrictive conditions and let us assume -- and that's the assumption of things that have procompetitive effects can also 6 6 my example -- that the athlete is worth more 7 7 have anticompetitive effects if certain conditions because of past investments to Zuffa than to 8 8 Bellator. So in making this offer you're not are satisfied. 9 9 certain of what the value to Zuffa is, but it's Q. Well, is bundling -- product bundling one 10 10 of those examples? Product bundles has many very likely to be higher. So I put all the -- I 11 11 put all the numbers into a contract, the athlete procompetitive effects and when engaged in by a 12 12 takes the contract to Zuffa, and Zuffa says done, firm without market power in any of the markets in 13 13 which the products they're bundling -we'll pay that, and that's our right of first 14 14 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. refusal. And so we can invoke that. 15 15 Q. So what effect, in your view, does that BY MR. CRAMER: 16 have Bellator's incentives to make a bid? 16 Q. I'll rephrase. Could bundling be one of 17 17 A. Bellator may have -- well, relative to those examples where product bundling can be 18 18 anticompetitive when engaged in by a firm with what because I don't -- if -- if it's -- I think we 19 19 went over this yesterday. Suppose we canceled the market power and procompetitive when engaged in by 20 20 right -- in one guy's contract, everybody else's a firm without market power? 21 21 contract stays the same. I know we did this --A. Yes, that's -- I mean, that and a myriad 22 22 Q. I think I can make it easier. of other examples under section 2. 23 23 MR. WIDNELL: I just want to make clear, A. I know we did this yesterday. 24 24 Q. We did. I think I can just make it you're asking for an economic opinion here, not a 25 25 legal opinion; is that right?

24 (Pages 356 to 359)



25 (Pages 360 to 363)

	364		366
1	A. Correct, assuming the truth of what I just	1	A. Yes.
2	agreed to. Back in 2001 the market was pretty	2	Q. And you note they acquired WFA and WEC in
3	small.	3	2006, right?
4	Q. Okay. You can put that document aside for	4	A. Yes.
5	the moment. I'm going to come back to it, but I'm	5	Q. And Pride in 2007; is that right?
6	going to put it aside for the moment.	6	A. Yes.
7		7	Q. And Affliction in 2009; is that right?
		8	A. Yes.
Ī		9	Q. And Strike Force in 2011; is that right?
		10	A. Yes.
		11	Q. Do you know if they acquired any other
12	Q. Do you know who the audience of the	12	promoters?
13	document was?	13	A. As I sit here I can't remember, but I
14	A. Probably potential lenders.	14	believe they have. I can't remember their names.
15	Q. And in putting together a document about	15	Q. In the last sentence of paragraph 173 you
16	information relating to a company for potential	16	say "At the time of these acquisitions each of the
17	lenders one would need to be scrupulously accurate	17	acquired MMA promoters was either too small to
18	about the information, correct?	18	appreciably change Zuffa's market share in either
19	A. Well, I mean, if I were creating a	19	the input or output market, was exiting the market,
20	document I would try to be accurate, you know, but	20	or both"; do you see that?
21	I've seen the disclaimers in documents like this	21	A. Yes.
22	that say, you know, not everything in a document	22	Q. I'm trying to understand you provide two
23	in our document is we can't verify that it's	23	different characterizations. One that the promoter
24	the total reliability of these things. There's all	24	was too small to change Zuffa's market share in the
25	kinds of caveats. I assume this was done under	25	input or output market; in the other that it was
23		23	
	365		367
1	standard business practice. Deutsche Bank was	1	exiting the market at the time of the acquisition,
2	involved and they would have been doing creating	2	right?
3	this in the way they would have created it for	3	A. Yes. It's an either/or.
4	another organization.	4	Q. Either/or. So now I'm going to ask you
5	Q. And they would attempt to be as accurate	5	which explanations apply to which promotions.
6	as they possibly could be in this document,	6	A. Oh, dear.
7	correct?	7	Q. So WFA, did the acquisition of WFA
8	A. They they would be as accurate as it	8	appreciably change Zuffa's market share in either
9	was valuable to be. There's costs to being	9	the input or output market?
10	accurate. I assume that they they did a good	10	A. My recollection from our calculations
11	job here.	11	using Dr. Singer's data is that it did not.
12	Q. It's fair to say that Deutsche Bank would	12	Q. Did the acquisition of WEC appreciably
13	not want to make material misrepresentations in a	13	change Zuffa's market share in either the input or
14	document like this to potential lenders, correct?	14	output market?
15	A. I think that would be a bad idea.	15	A. Our calculations are on the input side and
16	Q. All right. You can put that aside for the	16	my recollection is that it didn't affect any of
17	moment.	17	Dr. Singer's materially affect any of
18	Turn to paragraph 173, please.	18	Dr. Singer's share calculations.
19	A. Yes.	19	Q. It did not affect?
20	Q. Here you are discussing the promoters that	20	A. I'm trying to remember, but that's my
21	Zuffa acquired?	21	recollection. It has to affect it, right, but it
22	A. Yes.	22	didn't affect it much.
23	Q. And you observe that Zuffa acquired	23	Q. Right. You used the word "appreciably."
24	several MMA promotions between 2006 and 2011; is	24	With respect to Pride, did that
25	that right?	25	appreciably change Zuffa's market share in either
	man right.	ر تا	approciably change Zulia 8 market share in cither

26 (Pages 364 to 367)

	368		370
1	the input or output market?	1	after all, you're bringing the athletes of one less
2	A. Let me answer your question this way. I	2	well-known entity under the brand name of another
3	don't recall doing this firm by firm, acquisition	3	entity. So it simply says here there they
4	by acquisition. We did his his foreclosure	4	didn't change Zuffa's market share in the neither
5	so-called foreclosure shares and calculated it with	5	the input or the output market, appreciably change
6	these firms and without those firms.	6	the market share in either the input or output
7	Q. And when you calculated the foreclosure	7	market.
8	share with all of these firms together versus a	8	Q. Did
9	calculation without all of these firms, was there	9	A. I mean, was it a significant I don't
10	an appreciable change in foreclosure share?	10	know what the word "significant" means in this
11	A. I think we have an exhibit to that effect	11	context. It was a competitor.
12	and we said it was not an appreciable change.	12	Q. Did Strike Force have significant share of
13	Q. So all of the acquisitions together, in	13	the input or output markets at the time it was
14	your understanding, did not appreciably change	14	taken over by Zuffa?
15	Zuffa's market share in either the input or output	15	A. Evidently not.
16	market; is that what you're saying?	16	Q. Did any of the rivals that Zuffa purchased
17	A. Yes.	17	as identified in paragraph 173 have a significant
18	Q. So is it fair to say that what you're	18	share of the input or output markets at the time
19	saying is that all of these MMA promoters that	19	they were purchased?
20	Zuffa acquired were essentially insignificant as	20	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
21	competitors to Zuffa?	21	BY THE WITNESS:
22	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	22	A. As I said, I didn't do the calculations
23	BY THE WITNESS:	23	firm by firm. They certainly weren't as big as
24	A. No. I didn't do an analysis of whether	24	Zuffa.
25	they were insignificant or could have been	25	Q. Is it fair to say that none of the
	369		371
1	significant or anything like that. I'm just saying	1	competitors that Zuffa purchased that you
2	that it doesn't affect including them doesn't	2	identified in paragraph 173, in your view, had been
3	much affect Dr. Singer's calculations of his	3	able to challenge Zuffa's dominance in either the
4	so-called foreclosure.	4	input or output markets?
5	Q. So you have you have no opinion one way	5	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
6	or another whether, for example, Zuffa's	6	BY THE WITNESS:
7	acquisition of Strike Force was the acquisition of	7	A. Well, I don't know what it means to
8	a significant competitor or an insignificant	8	challenge dominance. I've seen dominance used in
9	competitor; am I right?	9	the context that noneconomists would use it. Zuffa
10	MR. WIDNELL: Objection.	10	has a level of market share in a position in the
11	BY THE WITNESS:	11	market.
12	A. It doesn't have a material impact on	12	Q. Is it fair to say
13	Zuffa's market share in the input or output market	13	A. It's been pretty stable over time.
14	is what is what we say here. That's the opinion	14	Q. Is it fair to say that none of the
15	I'm offering.	15	promoters that Zuffa acquired, in your view, have
16	Q. So was Strike Force a significant	16	been able to successfully challenge Zuffa's market
17	competitor to Zuffa at the time that Zuffa	17	share and market position that you say has been
18	purchased Strike Force in 2010 in your opinion?	18	stable over time in either the input or output
19	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	19	markets?
20	BY THE WITNESS:	20	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
21	A. They were they were a competitor and	21	BY THE WITNESS:
22	competitors are often acquired. There can be	22	A. Well, it's fair to say that these acquired
23	synergies between the two firms that make the	23	firms did not grow to be as large as Zuffa.
		1	
24	acquisition worthwhile and that are output	24	Q. Did any of these firms in your opinion as
24 25	acquisition worthwhile and that are output increasing and consumer welfare increasing because,	24 25	Q. Did any of these firms in your opinion as an economist before they were purchased by Zuffa

27 (Pages 368 to 371)

372 374 1 present a competitive threat to the UFC? 1 not profitable and doesn't do business in the 2 2 United States? A. They might have. I think all firms in 3 3 this market present a competitive threat to UFC. Q. Is it your opinion that Bellator has 4 Q. So when Zuffa purchased Strike Force, for 4 substantial market share and is profitable? 5 example, it was eliminating, in your opinion, a 5 A. It's -- it's got a substantial position in 6 competitive threat; is that right? 6 the market and it seems to be surviving. 7 7 A. Well, no. The -- take Strike Force, for Q. Is it your opinion that Bellator is 8 example. You know, everybody in the -- if they 8 profitable currently? 9 bought some small firm there's some competition 9 A. Well, it's an ongoing entity. So the 10 10 from that firm, that's all I'm saying. I mean, we present discounted value of what those investors 11 11 wouldn't want to say that these firms are in the think that this project is worth must be 12 market and they don't compete with Zuffa. They 12 positive. 13 13 were competing for athletes, they were competing Q. Is it your opinion that the revenues that 14 for eyeballs, they were competing, and the question 14 Bellator brings in in any year exceed the costs of 15 15 is whether it was addressed by antitrust running the organization in that year? 16 16 authorities and the like is whether these A. I've not looked at the balance sheets of 17 acquisitions materially affected competition in the 17 Bellator, but given that they're still in business, 18 18 market. Evidently they found that they didn't. there must be some anticipation of positive cash 19 So -- but these were -- these were firms operating 19 flow even if it's negative today. 20 and there are always benefits and potential costs 20 Q. So you're saying that it's your 21 21 understanding that there's an anticipation that of allowing acquisitions. 22 22 O. At the time that Strike Force was Bellator will one day be profitable, but you don't 23 23 purchased in 2010, did Strike Force, in your understand that Bellator's profitable today; is 24 24 opinion as an economist, present a significant that right? 25 economic threat to the UFC? 25 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 373 375 1 MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. BY THE WITNESS: 1 2 2 BY THE WITNESS: A. Well, I'm not -- I'm not offering an 3 A. Not such a threat that the acquisition 3 opinion of whether they have positive cash flow 4 would have -- would have materially affected 4 today. 5 5 competition to the detriment of consumers and --Q. When in your --6 and fighters. 6 A. Just as Zuffa did not have positive cash 7 7 Q. Did Pride at the time it was purchased flow when it was a young and nascent participant in 8 present a significant economic competitive threat 8 this market. 9 to Zuffa at the time it was purchased? 9 Q. When, in your opinion, did Bellator come 10 10 A. And my answer's the same. to have significant market share in the United 11 11 O. Would it be the same for all of the States? 12 entities? 12 A. I don't recall the time series on 13 A. Yes. 13 Bellator's market share. I recall that they have 14 14 television contracts. They're backed by Viacom and Q. Is it fair to say that even if we put the 15 15 promoters that Zuffa acquired aside --16 A. Let me finish -- let me say -- I should 16 Q. Putting Bellator aside for the moment, can 17 17 have put the word "adversely" affect competition. you identify another MMA promotion that does 18 18 Q. Is it fair to say, putting the promoters business in the United States that has significant 19 19 that Zuffa acquired aside, that your report does market share, in your opinion, and is profitable? 20 20 not identify a single MMA promotion other than A. Well, a lot of these must be profitable. 21 Zuffa that does business in the United States that 21 King of the Cage has been around putting on dozens 22 had substantial market share and was profitable? 22 of events every year for many years. There's a 23 23 long list of promoters that are -- that are doing MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 24 BY THE WITNESS: 24 this and -- you know, the market share you're 25 2.5 A. Are we -- are we saying that Bellator's referring to is very limited in its scope because

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428 430 1 1 A. For the experiment we just did, you know, A. Let's suppose we had a case that -- let me 2 2 we controlled for growth and other stuff and it was see if I can help you out or you can help me out or 3 3 just the -- I think if we understand each other, we can help each other out. 4 Q. Good. 4 it's a 2 percent reduction in wages. So give them 5 5 2 percent of their wages. A. Suppose there's a regression of wages on 6 some all-agreed-upon conduct indicator. Okay? So 6 Q. Let's say that the conduct in question had 7 7 there's -- and there's a before and after. another effect -- strike that. I get it. I'll 8 8 Q. Okay. move on. 9 A. And we say that wages were 2 percent lower 9 Paragraph 108, please. You state in 10 10 controlling for other stuff in the conduct period, paragraph 108 on page 47 -- I think I have the 11 11 wrong paragraph here. Oh, I mean paragraph 109. okay, and we're not doing anything about the --12 forget critiques of whether the conduct -- and 12 You quote or paraphrase something from 13 13 suppose it was a really good controlled experiment Dr. Singer. You say "As Dr. Singer notes, athletes 14 before and after. 14 value the opportunity to develop their careers by 15 15 Q. Fair enough. fighting against highly-ranked opponents and 16 16 A. Then there's a 2 percent impact of the audiences are drawn to fights among highly ranked 17 conduct, okay, which, as I just said, we're all 17 opponents"; do you see that? 18 going to agree that this is right -- the right way 18 A. Yes. 19 to measure the conduct. 19 Q. Do you agree with Dr. Singer's 20 Q. Understood. 20 observation? 21 A. Then one would need the stipulation along 21 A. That people want to fight highly ranked 22 22 with that that the practices in question didn't opponents? 23 23 have some offsetting impact that would have raised Q. Yes. 24 24 A. Well, they want to fight highly-ranked pay because -- but we have a before and after 25 that's the conduct period. So we've really taken 25 opponents when they think they're ready to fight 429 431 1 that into account. 1 highly-ranked opponents. 2 2 Q. So let's say in your example with the Q. And are audiences drawn to fights among 3 well-specified regression showing a 2 percent 3 highly-ranked opponents? 4 decrease in wages after when compared to before 4 A. I think -- I think ratings are higher. I 5 5 that revenues were different in the after period think there was some evidence that ratings are 6 and the before period. Would you multiply the 2 6 higher when highly-ranked people fight against each 7 percent times the amount of revenues that you 7 other. 8 thought would be existing in the but-for world or 8 Q. Do you agree that MMA fighters value the 9 the amount of revenues that would be existing in 9 ability to develop their careers by fighting 10 10 the actual world? against highly-ranked opponents when they're ready MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 11 11 to fight them? 12 BY THE WITNESS: 12 A. Yeah. I think that's why they sign up. 13 A. Okay. Well, see, you know, I didn't 13 That's one of the reasons they sign up. Q. Is it fair to say that a fighter can't --14 succeed in getting us on the same page because you 14 15 15 just multiplied by revenues. So revenues just came cannot advance in the rankings unless that 16 sneaking in through the back door. It was a 16 fighter's able to fight other fighters that are 17 17 2 percent change in their pay, their compensation, ranked higher than them, right? 18 18 their salary. MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form. 19 Q. Okay. I understand. 19 BY THE WITNESS: 20 20 A. I don't think that's literally true, but A. Revenues is gone. 21 Q. All right. Understood. Okay. So do you 21 you don't have to fight somebody higher than you to 22 multiply, then, by the total amount of compensation 22 23 23 paid to the workers in the actual world or the Q. But in order to substantially move up in 24 total amount of compensation you believe would have 24 the rankings, all things equal, it would be better 25 25 been paid to the workers in the but-for world? for you to fight higher ranked fighters, correct?

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
	432		434
1	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	1	platform that has been successful in attracting the
2	BY THE WITNESS:	2	top athletes and that complementarity plays a
3	A. Since I don't know exactly how the ratings	3	role.
4	or the rankings happen, let's assume they're like	4	Q. How do you define "significant share" as
5	college football rankings, then you take into	5	you use that term in this sentence?
6	account the types of opponents you've had and how	6	A. All other things equal, a firm that is
7	you did and somebody has a formula that tries to	7	attracting the top athletes will see its share
8	take that into account. Same thing with golf	8	among the top athletes rise.
9	rankings and all sorts of things.	9	Q. And that's because fighters generally have
10	Q. All things equal, consumers will be	10	an interest in competing against the best fighters,
11	willing to pay more to see highly-ranked opponents	11	right?
12	fight than lower-ranked opponents fight; is that	12	A. Well, that's part of it, but the
13	fair?	13	complementarity is there's more energy created when
14	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	14	you put the good fighters against each other. So
15	BY THE WITNESS:	15	the the customers like that too.
16	A. In every instance, no, but on average	16	Q. And those are the fights that would likely
17	probably yes.	17	lead to career advancement and higher compensation
18	Q. Higher ranked fighters, all things equal,	18	ultimately, correct?
19	generate more revenues when they fight than	19	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.
20	lower-ranked fighters, correct?	20	BY MR. CRAMER:
21	MR. WIDNELL: Objection, form.	21	Q. The ones with higher energy.
22	BY THE WITNESS:	22	A. Broadly speaking.
23	A. Not always, but on average that's probably	23	Q. Broadly speaking, yes?
24	true.	24	A. Broadly speaking, if I if I'm
25	Q. Turn to paragraph 96, please. In the	25	successful against higher-ranked people, I will
	433		435
1	first sentence after the dash you state "There is a	1	probably advance more and get paid more and so on,
2	natural tendency for a leading promoter to attract	2	as I understand the process.
3	a significant share of the top athletes"?	3	Q. You can put that paragraph aside.
4	A. Yes.	4	Would you agree with me that by
5	Q. "This follows," you say, "from the	5	restricting fighter mobility used the challenged
6	complimentarity of athlete talents in producing	6	contracts Zuffa's made it more difficult for other
7	high-quality bouts"	7	MMA promotions to access UFC's top fighters, all
8	A. That's the point we just made.	8	things equal?
9	Q "and the desire among athletes to fight	9	A. No.
10	against the best"; do you see that?	10	Q. Are you aware that Zuffa and banks working
11	A. Yes.	11	with Zuffa have seen the challenged contracts and
12	Q. And you agree with that?	12	describe the challenged contracts as barriers to
13	A. Yes.	13	entry to rivals?
14	Q. Can you please explain the natural	14	A. I think I know what you're to what you
15	tendency for a leading promoter to attract a	15	are referring and I wouldn't characterize it that
16	significant share of the top athletes. What does	16	way.
17	that mean?	17	Q. All right. Would you take a look at what
18	A. It means that athletes their talents	18	has been marked as Exhibit 12. We marked it
19	are complementary, that the good athletes want to	19	earlier today. It was in the pile in front of you.
20	be in the places where the where the other good	20	A. Exhibit
21	athletes are so they can fight them. And then	21	Q. 12. It is the
22	it's it's kind of a feedback system that you	22	A. It's the Deutsche Bank?
23	attract some of the good athletes, they fight well,	23	Q. Correct.
24	it makes it more attractive for the other good athletes, and so on. So Zuffa kind of runs a	24 25	A. What page do you want? Q. I would like you to turn to page 7 of the
25			

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
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